Good Science – A Working Alexandrian Definition

In the Alexandrian tradition, good science has a very specific set of general attributes.  These correspond to the principles of the Proverbs, and their implicit mode of construction (namely, observation and induction, See Proverbs 24).  These general traits include what we actually saw employed in the civilization of Alexandria (330 BCE – CE 632).  These merit the following labels:

  1. Observability – the science and its theories should be tied to observability for consideration as a realist enterprise, namely because this central theory virtue connects it to so many other like virtues, including repeatability, verifiability and falsifiability.
  2. Experimentation – trial and error now has new and very profitable modes, including the use of (increasingly more sophisticated) computer models and simulation software; conceptual Baconianism (articulating a paradigm to study its predictions and implicates); trying different math and logic systems to see what such different “lenses” would yield as an alternative “world” of consequences and possibilities (Virtual-world context variation for theory testing and innovation), etc
  3. Innovation – good science should seek to provide new intellectual capital, patents, copyrighted ideas, technologies, problem-solving theories and formulas, etc
  4. Profitability – good science should aim at increasing value in the free markets, earning money for those who yield new technologies and other innovations, and increasing value more generally for business partners, and economies.
  5. Solution-oriented — Good science should aim to create new concepts, tools and technologies aimed at cleaning up the environment, providing cheaper and better energy sources, improving the economy or the academy, or solving some particular medical problems (cure cancers, etc).
  6. Humanitarianism, Mercy and Charity – Good science should aim at relieving distress, disease and disorders both in the animals and humans globally, and in improving their lot on a long-term basis, not merely in the near future.
  7. Alexandrian – This trait refers to those of the sciences yielded in that Greek-Egyptian civilization just named. This means world-class “Library-centered,” and one that favors many different forms of geometry and trigonometry, including advanced forms yet to be innovated (see my proposed “Stochastic Geometry” for replacing Calculus as a “math of process description”). This would include the use of Fractal Geometry, Discreet Geometries and the like, as having primary usefulness.
  8. Testable – this ordinarily has the understood drawback today in consideing that most theories involve many interwoven claims and propositions, some of which are held “immune from revision.” It is not always known just which propositions in the claim matrix are in fact being tested, since noting just which propositions in that theory matrix remain thus protected remains a difficult task. These are not immediately apparent. Nevertheless, one can describe tests in a “validity manner” — that is to say — “given these propositions held “immune from revision,” under these conditions, you would get the following results…” We might call this the “Tarskization of The Testing Criterion” in Science (See Alfred Tarski entry at Wikipedia).

Concluding Quasi-scientific Postscript:

In my brain-file entitled “Alexandrian Notes in the philosophy of the sciences,” an important matter in what I might call “Kuhnian studies” has arisen.  Please recall that Dr. Thomas Kuhn held that all facts remain “theory-dependent,” much as the late Dr. Van Til taught that “all facts are facts in relation” (to still other facts).  This seems to run into some conflict with his idea of how a transition begins leading into what some call a “Scientific Revolution.”  Kuhn’s transition from “Normal Science” into a state of Crisis occurs at least by the number of “counter-instances” to the reigning paradigm snowballing until new theory rivals proliferate to challenge the old and greying champion.

The question that seems to arise is this: if all facts are theory dependent, how do counter-instances arise in the first place, when these suggest a paradigm that constructs these contrarian facts, which cannot be the reigning paradigm.

In other words, no counter-instances could arise given:

  1. All facts are theory-dependent
  2. The supreme paradigm does not comport with the contrarian data
  3. No other significant rivals exist in the timeframe, and by the definition of, normal science
  4. So how do counterinstances then arise??

This is merely a proposed problem for future investigation, and may find its answer in the value of critics and their contrarian lobbying habits, whose tacit assumptions may be unknown to them (and they may not care, so long as their plucked chickens land timely upon the right table).


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